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Abstract
This thesis investigates recently proposed enhancements to the Basel II market
risk framework. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced a
stressed Value-at-Risk, calculated from one year long period of financial stress,
to be added to the current VaR as a reaction to the shortage in capital re-
serves of banks and thus their inability to cover extensive losses observed during
the recent crisis. We present an empirical evidence that such an extension of
the regulatory capital is not optimal. Firstly, supplementing an unconditional
methods of VaR estimation, i.e. normal parametric VaR and historical simu-
lation, by SVaR only lead to unnecessarily high capital requirements even in a
low volatile periods whilst the same amount of capital during the crisis could
be achieved using either the conditional GARCH VaR with student’s-t inno-
vations or the volatility weighted historical simulation. Moreover, we showed
that all unconditional methods fail to capture volatility clusters such as the
2008 crisis.
JEL Classification C51, C52, C53, C58, G01, G28, G32





Tato práce se zabývá nedávným rozš́ı̌reńım rámce pro tržńı riziko Baselu II
v němž Basilejský výbor pro bankovńı dohled představil takzvaný “stressed
Value-at-Risk” model, jenž se odhaduje z jeden rok dlouhého obdob́ı finančńıho
stresu, který muśı být přičten k současné denńı hodnotě VaRu. Toto opatřeńı
je reakćı Basilejského výboru na nedostatečný kapitál bank a jejich neschop-
nost pokrýt ztráty zp̊usobené nedávnou finančńı kriźı. Představujeme zde em-
pirické d̊ukazy, že navrhované rozš́ı̌reńı neńı optimálńı. Zaprvé, doplňováńı
nepodmı́něných metod odhadu VaRu, jako je např́ıklad parametrická metoda
předpokládaj́ıćı normálńı rozděleńı denńıch ztrát nebo historická simulace, o
hodnotu modelu SVaR má za následek zbytečně vysoké kapitálové požadavky
a to i v dobách ńızké volatility trh̊u. Zat́ımco stejné hodnoty kapitálových
požadavk̊u může být dosaženo pomoćı podmı́něných metod, jako např́ıklad
GARCH model s použit́ım studentova rozděleńı nebo volatilitou vážená his-
torická simulace. Zadruhé, všechny nepodmı́něné modely selhaly v zachyceńı
klastr̊u během nedávné krize.
Klasifikace JEL C51, C52, C53, C58, G01, G28, G32
Kĺıčová slova Value-at-Risk, Stressed Value-at-Risk,
Basel II, Basel 2.5, GARCH
E-mail autora vojtech.pizl@gmail.com
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Value-at-Risk (VaR) has been established as a device for measuring market
risk in the 1996 Amendment to the first Basel Accord. Banks who choose so
called internal model approach to calculate the minimum capital requirements
have to estimate VaR on a daily basis. Nevertheless, a particular method to
obtain an accurate VaR forecast has not been prescribed yet, which led to wide
adoption of models based on either normal distribution or historical simulation,
the methods which have been criticized by many authors over the past decade.
During the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis many of those banks did not
manage to cover severe losses that they experienced. The capital which they
have to set aside in case of adverse market movements was clearly insufficient
and hence the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in the latest
enhancement to the capital adequacy framework proposed several changes. One
of them is that a so called stressed VaR (SVaR) number have to be added to the
ordinary VaR in order to ensure that this shortage in capital will not recur in
the future. SVaR is intended to replicate VaR but it has to be calculated from
one year long period of significant financial stress relevant to the institution’s
portfolio.
The aim of this thesis is twofold. At first we will review several current
methods to estimate VaR and investigate their performance on daily returns of
the S&P 500 index. Although similar researches were conducted in the past,
most of them are outdated and with data from the recent crisis we will be able
better assess each model’s performance. Moreover, we included the conditional
version of historical simulation of Hull & White (1998) which have not been
tested on recent data yet (to our best knowledge).
The second target is to assess a contribution of a stressed VaR to the cur-
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rent market risk framework. To the author’s best knowledge there is only one
research concerning an application of proposed changes which were conducted
by Rossignoloa et al. (2012). However, we propose a slightly different approach
by assuming that these proposals have been applied in the beginning of 1990
allowing us to test SVaR performance not only during the 2008 crisis but also
before and after this period when the markets were calm and thus required
capital was lower.
Furthermore, we present a graphical analysis of each model performance
during this crisis as well as comparisons of the new and the old minimum
capital frameworks. The hypothesis we want to test is whether the additional
measure really is essential for bank to meet market losses or if the desired level
of capital could be achieved within old framework using conditional models
and, most importantly, without overstating risk in non-stressed periods.
The Thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 at first briefly recaps devel-
opment of the regulatory framework from the first Basel Accord to the latest
proposal called Basel 2.5. Moreover, an academic response is discussed as well
as a review of the literature concerning an application of VaR in practice.
The last section is devoted to the stressed VaR literature. Chapter 3 intro-
duces a value-at-risk concept and provides an overview of selected methods of
its estimation. Also two formal tests for an evaluation of VaR performance
are discussed. Chapter 4 conducts an empirical analysis which is divided into
three parts. The first part investigates performance of selected VaR models,
then the SVaR is estimated and finally all models are implemented into new
and old regulatory framework. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter is divided into three parts. Firstly, we review current regulatory
framework focusing mainly on market risk, then we deal with a VaR application
in practise and finally we review a stressed VaR related literature.
2.1 Regulatory framework
Before we begin discussing the latest Basel proposals, we should recap a devel-
opment of international bank regulation in the past two decades. Since 1988,
when the first Basel Accord has been introduced, there have been a structural
change in the financial markets, especially a development of complex financial
products such as off-balance sheet derivatives, swaps, mortgage securitization,
etc. This process, commonly known as the financial engineering, is together
with unsatisfactory regulation according to many people partly responsible for
the recent financial crisis. Whilst this is a subject of discussion and definitely
not the topic of this thesis, we will look how these changes affect the banking
regulation.
We start with a short history lesson of the banking regulation since 1988
(major source for this part is Crouhy et al. (2006, chap. 3)), then we look at the
academic response to the Basel II and finally we review the latest amendment
called the Basel 2.5.
2.1.1 Basel I
The first Basel rules were published in 1988 after a discussion among bankers of
the Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of England. They started to concern
persisting regulatory framework which they view as unsatisfactory. Due to
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the increasing investments of banks into off-balance-sheet products as well as
loans to the third world countries, the uniform minimum capital requirement
standard became insufficient.
The Basel I was implemented in 1992 and focused mainly on credit risk.
The minimum regulatory capital was no longer uniform but depended on bank’s
credit exposures. Borrowers were divided into several groups based on their
riskiness and each group had different capital requirements. But this division
was in many cases illogical and did not express the true amount of risk of
each group. Furthermore, the market risk was completely ignored which led to
transforming credit risk into “capital cheaper” market risk instruments.
A step forward made the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996)
Basel I Amendment implemented in 1998. For the first time market risk was
included in the regulatory capital computation. The institutions were allowed
to choose between two methods to obtain the amount of capital to cover their
exposures to market risk - the standardized approach and the internal model
approach. Whilst the former method prescribes using the exact method as it
is specified in the 1996 Amendment, the latter allows each bank to use its own
value-at-risk model. Although the internal model approach does not specify the
particular VaR model, it requires each bank to meet the qualitative standards
such as the independent risk control unit responsible for the risk management
system, a regular backtesting programme, a rigorous stress-testing programme,
etc. It’s also worth noting here that also the credit risk computation was revised
in the 1996 Amendment but we will not go into details because it is not a topic
of this thesis.
2.1.2 Basel II
The Basel I rules were flawed for several reasons connected mainly with credit
risk (see Crouhy et al. 2006, pp. 68-70). These shortcomings resulted in a
“regulatory arbitrage” which is a situation when bank “modify its behaviour
so that it incurs lower capital charges while still incurring the same amount of
actual risk” (Crouhy et al. 2006, p. 69) This is usually done by using secu-
ritization (for example mortgage backed securities such as collateralized debt
obligations) and credit derivatives. In order to dispose of this problem regula-
tors had to publish modified Basel rules which do not give banks incentives to
bend the rules. In other words, the regulatory capital should better reflect the
risk that a bank is taking.
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The Basel II was released in 2004 with an intention to replace the 1988
Accord. New rules endeavoured to overcome above mentioned shortcomings
through establishing so called “three pillars” capital regulation framework (see
Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Basel II three pillar framework
Pillar I:
Minimum Capital Requirements








Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006)
Pillar I is unambiguously the most important. Its objective is to revise
the Basel I Accord of 1988, that is to introduce minimum capital requirements
which better correspond to the bank’s risk profile. The 1988 Accord accounted
only for the credit risk and the market risk was further added in its 1996 Amend-
ment, the Basel II goes step forward and introduces operational risk - losses
caused by frauds by employees, computer failures, human errors, etc. The in-
stitutions are allowed to choose between three methods to obtain the credit risk
capital: the standardized approach and two internal rating-based approaches
(IRB). While the standardized approach relies on credit rating agencies, under
the IRB approach banks could use their own assessment of credit risk, pro-
vided they meet qualitative criteria set by the Basel II Accord. Market risk is
calculated using the same approach as it was defined in the 1996 Amendment.
Pillar II is designed to ensure that banks measure their risk correctly and
its main objective is to dispose of the regulatory arbitrage. In other words, this
pillar concerns mainly the supervisory approach to risk management.
Pillar III deals with banks disclosure of risk information to the investors.
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2.1.3 Basel II Criticism
Despite the improvement of the regulatory framework in the Basel II proposal,
many academics expressed their concerns about its ability to ensure stability of
the global financial system. Danielsson et al. (2001) in their Academic response
to the Basel II discuss several issues.
They view the risk as an endogenous variable whereas existing models (VaR)
treat it as an exogenous process. They equate risk managers behaviour to the
weather forecasting. The risk managers believe that risk forecasting will not
affect the markets, similarly as the meteorologists does not affect the weather.
But the markets (and so it is volatility) are partly determined by their be-
haviour. While this failure in assumption is relatively harmless in normal times
when the participants behaviour is heterogeneous, during the crises when the
behaviour of the market participants become more homogeneous this may cause
extensive losses. Danielsson (2002) further discusses this issue and states that
“a risk model breaks down when used for regulatory purposes.” He illustrates
this limitation of risk models on events during the 1998 Russia crisis. It was
shortly after implementation of VaR models into the regulatory framework,
therefore when volatility increased as the 1997 Asian crisis struck the broadly
used VaR models led to application of similar trading strategies and worsened
the crisis.
Another issue they discuss is the normality assumption which results in a
misleading VaR estimates. It has been proven that daily returns (for example
of equity indices) are not normally distributed and exhibit fat tails and clusters.
This is further discussed in Section 3.3.
They also criticize the reliance on credit rating agencies for the standardised
approach to credit risk measurement, controversial operational risk modelling
and inherent procyclicality of financial regulations, but these topics are out of
scope of this thesis.
2.1.4 Basel 2.5
As a reaction to the significant losses that occurred during the 2007-2008 crisis
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009b) in the Revisions to the
Basel II market risk framework suggest several improvements. They view the
capital framework based on the 1996 Amendment as unsatisfactory and hence
they introduce two main enhancements:
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• An Incremental Risk Charge (IRC), which attempts to capture default
as well as migration risk for unsecuritized credit products.
• A stressed Value-at-Risk (SVaR), which requires banks to calculate an ad-
ditional VaR measure based on one-year data from a period of significant
financial stress related to the banks portfolio.
The former is related to credit risk and we do not endeavour to assess its impact
on banks in this thesis. The latter, on the other hand, is the major topic of
our interest and it would be convenient to take up with this concept.
Under the 1996 Amendment banks that chose internal model approach to
calculate market risk must have computed a capital requirements “as the higher
of (i) its previous day’s Value-at-Risk number (V aRt−1) and (ii) an average of
the daily value-at-risk measures on each of the preceding sixty business days
(V aRavg), multiplied by a multiplication factor (mc)” (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision 2005, p. 41). Where the multiplication factor mc has
a value between 3 and 4 based on the model’s ex-post performance in the
past. Under the Basel 2.5 a capital requirement is expressed as the sum of
the 1996 Amendment charge, which we just described, and “the higher of (i)
latest available stressed Value-at-Risk number (SV aRt−1) and (ii) an average
of the stressed Value-at-Risk numbers over the preceding sixty business days
(SV aRavg), multiplied by a multiplication factor (ms)” (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision 2009b, p. 15) We may summarize it using the following
formula:
MCR = max {V aRt−1,mc · V aRavg}+ max {SV aRt−1,ms · SV aRavg}, (2.1)
The multiplication factor ms is set by supervisory authorities but has minimal
value of 3 plus an additional factor k which has value between 0 and 1 based
on VaR (but not SVaR) performance in a backtest.
Stressed VaR measure is “intended to replicate a VaR calculation if the
relevant market factors were experiencing a period of stress; and should be
therefore based on the 10-day, 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence interval
VaR measure of the current portfolio, with model inputs calibrated to historical
data from continuous 12 month period of significant financial stress to the
bank’s portfolio” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2009b, p. 14).
The BCBS requires banks to calculate SVaR at least weakly and no particular
model is prescribed. Furthermore, BCBS suggests the financial turmoil in
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2007-2008 to be used as the stress period, although other periods must be also
considered.
However, one issue discussed by Standard & Poor’s Financial Services (2012)
is that the banks have to use proxies for securities that did not exist in a used
stress period (for example during the 2008 crisis) and this choice may result
in different SVaR estimates. They also show on a survey of 11 large interna-
tional banks that SVaR composes the largest part of the Basel 2.5 risk charge
of 29%. On the contrary, they claim that the banks which use the standardised
approach for the regulatory capital computation are less affected by the Basel
2.5.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a) conducted the quantita-
tive impact study of proposed Basel 2.5 revisions. Using data from 38 banks
from 10 countries stressed VaR numbers were compared with non-stressed VaR
measures. On average SVaR was 2.6 times higher than non-stressed VaR and
its introduction on average resulted in 110% increase in the minimal capital
requirements for market risk.
2.2 VaR in Practice
Although VaR has been pushed by regulators since 1996 Amendment, the first
empirical research concerning the accuracy of VaR models used by the financial
institutions was conducted by Berkowitz & O’Brien (2002). They showed on
historical P&L and daily VaR estimates obtained from 6 large U.S. banks that
these estimates are rather conservative and tend to overestimate risk. Only
one bank reported 6 violations during 581 trading days, the others experienced
only from 0 to 3 violations during the same period. Moreover, they applied the
GARCH model to each bank’s P&L and the results outperformed VaR forecasts
obtained by banks. Similarly, Pérignon et al. (2008) examined VaR estimates
of the six largest banks in Canada. The results shows popularity of a historical
simulation and, most importantly, extremely low number of violations. There
were only two violations out of the expected number of 74. This result even
more support findings from the previous research. However, they claim that
this overstatement of market risk is caused by bank’s cautiousness rather than
their inability to measure risk correctly. Pérignon & Smith (2010a) further
investigated this overestimation of VaR and tested if it is caused by incomplete
accounting for diversification effect among broad risk categories. Nevertheless,
they did not find any signs of underestimation of this effect and hence they
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view VaR as a biased risk tool. It should be noted that above mentioned
researches were conducted before the 2008 crisis and hence did not contain this
most volatile period.
2.3 Stressed VaR literature
Probably the only research concerning the application of the new Basel propos-
als was conducted by Rossignoloa et al. (2012). They analysed the accuracy
of several VaR models to compute minimum capital requirements within the
old and the proposed framework on the data from Emerging and Frontier stock
markets. The results suggest that using the Extreme value theory (EVT) may
make SVaR redundant.
Different possibilities how to calculate a valid stressed VaR number are
reviewed in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) working paper
named Messages from the academic literature on risk measurement for the trad-
ing book. One method of conducting a stressed VaR estimate discussed here is
stressing the correlation matrix used in all VaR methodologies. However, there
is a problem with rising correlation among all risk-factors in the correlation
matrix during crisis periods such as the 2008 financial turmoil.
Alexander & Ledermann (2012) introduce a random orthogonal matrix
(ROM) simulation as a device for VaR and SVaR computation. They endeav-
our to overcome above mentioned issues through generating a large number of
stress testing data. Their approach also accounts for higher moments such as
skewness and kurtosis which are known to increase rapidly during crisis periods.
Chapter 3
Theoretical Framework
The aim of this chapter is to provide rigorous overview of a theoretical back-
ground required for the empirical part of this thesis. We start with a basic
concepts, then we move to Value-at-Risk model - its definition and approaches
to computation. The largest part of this chapter is devoted to describing each
individual model that we are using in the empirical research. The last part
explains formal statistical test to evaluate model’s performance in a backtest.
3.1 Basic Concepts
3.1.1 Loss Distribution
Before we start describing individual models for financial risk, we must formally
define basic concepts such as profit-and-loss (P&L) distribution, risk factors and
mapping. We will adapt a theoretical framework from McNeil et al. (2005).
P&L distribution can be defined as a distribution of changes in a value
of a portfolio, i.e. the changes in value Vt+1 − Vt, where Vt and Vt+1 are the
portfolio values at time t and t+1, respectively. However, according to McNeil
et al. (2005), in risk management we are concerned with the probability of large
losses, therefore, we will use the loss distribution instead of P&L. Then
Lt+1 := −(Vt+1 − Vt) (3.1)
is the loss of the portfolio from day t to day t+ 1.
McNeil et al. (2005) follows standard risk-management practice and models
the value Vt as a function of time t and a d-dimensional vector of risk factors
Zt (logarithmic prices of financial assets, exchange rates, yields, etc.). Then a
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portfolio value is
Vt = f(t,Zt), (3.2)
where f is a function f : R+ × Rd → R. This representation of the portfolio
value is called a mapping of risks.
The series of risk factor changes (Xt)t∈N is defined by Xt := Zt − Zt−1.
Then we can write the portfolio loss as:
Lt+1 = −(f(t+ 1,Zt + Xt+1)− f(t,Zt)). (3.3)
Because risk factors are observable at time t, so it is Zt. The series of risk-factor
changes Xt+1 therefore determine the loss distribution. Hence McNeil et al.
(2005) introduces another piece of notation, the loss operator l[t] : Rd → R,
which maps risk factor changes into losses.
l[t](x) := −(f(t+ 1,Zt + x)− f(t,Zt)), x ∈ Rd. (3.4)
We can see that Lt+1 = l[t](Xt+1).
To represent loss as a linear function of the risk-factor changes, McNeil et al.


















where subscripts to f denote partial derivatives. This approximation is the best
provided small risk-factor changes and portfolio value linear in the risk-factors.
In this thesis we consider portfolio of single stock (represented by stock
index). Now we will derive a loss of this portfolio using an approach of McNeil
et al. (2005, p. 29) but setting d = 1. Lets denote the price process of our stock
by (St)t∈N. As a risk factor we use logarithmic prices, i.e. Zt = ln(St), since this
is a standard practise in risk management. Then we can write the risk factor
changes as Xt+1 = ln(St+1) − ln(St) and the portfolio value as Vt = exp(Zt).
Then
Lt+1 = −(Vt+1 − Vt) = −St · (exp(Xt+1)− 1),
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and the linearised loss L∆t+1 is given by
L∆t+1 = −St ·Xt+1.
Since we have only one stock in our portfolio and most of daily returns are
small, this approximation is quite well. Moreover, we set the total portfolio
value Vt = St = 1. Then
L∆t+1 = −Xt+1. (3.7)
Therefore (Lt+1) is the process of negative log-returns.
This seems like a complicated approach to derive an obvious fact, but it is
because we have a portfolio of single stock. A mapping of risk is very important
when we have more then one risk factor. Consider an investment into USD/euro
call option. Then the value of a position depends on the USD/euro exchange
rate, the dollar and euro interest rates over the maturity of the option and on
the USD/euro volatility (Crouhy et al. 2006, pp. 161-162). Although we are
considering the portfolio represented by a single stock index (and hence we set
d = 1 in (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6)), proper definitions are necessary to show what
simplification are we using.
3.1.2 Conditional and Unconditional Loss Distribution
Both conditional and unconditional models are presented in this thesis, there-
fore it is convenient to properly define these concepts. Again, we will use
theoretical scope presented by McNeil et al. (2005) to retain consistency.
Suppose that we have a stationary distribution FX of the series of risk-factor
changes (Xt)t∈N and Ft = σ({Xs : s ≤ t}) is the sigma algebra representing
the publicly available information at time t. The distribution FXt+1|F is the
conditional distribution of Xt+1 given current information Ft. For example
Xt+1 can follow GARCH process (more in Section 3.3.3). On the other hand,
FX is not conditional on any past values of Xt.
Now we can define the conditional loss distribution FLt+1|F as the distribu-
tion of the loss operator l[t](·) under FXt+1|F . Formally (McNeil et al. 2005, p.
28):
FLt+1|F(l) = P (l[t](Xt+1) ≤ l | Ft) = P (Lt+1 ≤ l | Ft), l ∈ R, (3.8)
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and the unconditional loss distribution FLt+1 as the distribution of the loss
operator l[t](·) under stationary distribution FX of risk-factor changes.
3.2 Value-at-Risk
Value at Risk (VaR) is an easy concept for measuring risk. Its definition is
very straightforward and hence it is widely used among risk managers. In this
section we will look closer at the VaR concept.
3.2.1 Value-at-Risk Definition
VaR is defined as a loss in a market value of a portfolio over the given time
horizon t which will not be exceeded at a given probability p provided the
portfolio is hold static over the time horizon. Mathematically VaR can be
defined as (McNeil et al. 2005, p. 38):
Definition 3.1 (Value-at-Risk). Given some confidence level α ∈ (0, 1). The VaR
of our portfolio at the confidence level α is given by the smallest number l such
that the probability that the loss L exceeds l is no larger than (1−l). Formally:
V aRα = inf{l ∈ R : P (L > l) ≤ 1− α} = inf{l ∈ R : FL(l) ≥ α} (3.9)
Where the FL(l) = P (L ≤ l) is a distribution function of the underlying
loss distribution. As McNeil et al. (2005) points out, VaR is simply a quantile
of the corresponding loss distribution, thus can be computed easily. Values for
the confidence level α are most often 0.95 and 0.99, and the time horizon t is
typically 1 or 10 days.
One of the biggest drawbacks of VaR, that has been discussed by many
academics in the past two decades, is that we do not have any information
about losses which occur with a probability lower then (1−α). These could be
far beyond the value of V aRα. It is very important to understand that the VaR
does not represent maximal loss over the time horizon. Instead it represents
loss that will not be exceeded within the given probability. Therefore one can
loose almost entire value of a portfolio although the VaR estimate was only few
percent. This is given by the underlying distribution which is never known in
practice.
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3.2.2 Value-at-Risk Estimation Methods
Generally speaking, there are three steps in a VaR calculation. At first, the
institution has to identify a restricted number of risk-factors which effects the
institutions portfolio and derive the value of the portfolio in terms of risk-factor
changes. This is called the mapping of risk and it is described in Section 3.1.
Once risk-factors have been identified, the risk manager must derive the distri-
bution of risk-factor changes - this is the most important step in VaR calculation
and also the most problematic. The last step is straightforward - at a chosen
significance level α the VaR number can be read off as a 1− α quantile of the
loss distribution.
There are many different methods how the loss distribution can be derived,
but the most of them stem from one of the three basic categories:
• Parametric models,
• Historical simulation,
• Monte Carlo simulation.
The first model makes an assumption of parametric distribution for the risk-
factor changes, i.e. normal or student’s-t distribution. Historical simulation
uses large amount of historical data to estimate the empirical distribution but
makes no parametric assumptions. The Monte Carlo model, in its basic form,
makes similar assumptions to the normal linear VaR model.
3.3 Parametric VaR
This section focuses on parametric approaches to measure risk. These methods
differ in the distribution that is fitted to data. Crouhy et al. (2006) explains
that assumptions that we make about the distribution should be consistent
with an empirical return process that is characterized by the stylized facts -
a collection of empirical features of financial time series. We present here a
version of McNeil et al. (2005, p. 117):
1. Return series are not iid although they show little serial correlation.
2. Series of absolute or squared returns show profound serial correlation.
3. Conditional expected returns are close to zero.
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4. Volatility appears to vary over time.
5. Return series are leptokurtic or heavy-tailed.
6. Extreme returns appear in clusters.
The last two are also the most important because both are not satisfied by
the unconditional normal distribution - the easiest way of VaR estimation.
The first problem is that the Gaussian distribution ignores an extreme rare
events (large profits and losses) and this is certainly not a property of a good
risk measure. The solution for this could be to assume a fat-tailed student’s-t
distribution instead of the normal. But this will not solve the last issue - the
volatility clustering. McNeil et al. (2005, p. 118) compared simulated normal
and student’s-t processes with DAX return data from 10 year period. It is
shown that neither normal or student’s-t model is able to simulate volatility
clusters, i.e. a situation when an extreme return observed on one day is followed
by another extreme return, which does not need to have the same sign. In other
words, a large profit could be followed by large loss and vice versa. In order to
take account of this phenomenon we should assume the distributions of returns
which is conditional on a volatility process which is able to capture volatility
clustering. For example the GARCH(1,1) process of Bollerslev (1987) seem to
have this property.
In the rest of this section we further look at the normal and the student’s-t
model (both unconditional and conditional versions).
3.3.1 Unconditional Normal VaR
The easiest way to compute VaR is to assume that the loss distribution is
normal with mean µ and variance σ2. Fix α ∈ (0, 1), then (McNeil et al. 2005,
p. 39)
V aRα = µ+ σΦ
−1(α) (3.10)
where Φ−1(α) denotes the α-quantile of the standard normal distribution func-
tion. As McNeil et al. (2005) remarks, if the time horizon is short and µ is close
to zero, V aRmeanα := V aRα − µ is used for capital-adequacy purposes instead
of ordinary VaR.
V aRmeanα = σΦ
−1(α) (3.11)
In this thesis we assume that mean is zero and therefore use formula 3.11.
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The question is: why do we bother with explaining the unconditional normal
VaR formula even though we criticized this model in the introduction to this
section? Partly because we want to show these weaknesses in the empirical
part of this thesis and compare this model with the other VaR models. But the
main reason is to find out whether the model could be improved by adding some
additional measure in form of a stressed VaR or if it only mitigates wrongly
assumed normality.
3.3.2 Unconditional Student’s-t VaR
One of the stylized facts of financial time series is that the distribution of
daily returns (losses) is heavy tailed. Ignoring this feature and using normality
assumption leads to an underestimation of VaR. One way to deal with heavy
tails which are present in financial data is to use a student’s-t distribution.
Huisman et al. (1998) argues that t-distribution better fit to the empirical
distribution than normal because of its ability to assign more probability to
extreme events. Heaviness of tails is characterized by degrees of freedom ν of
the student’s-t distribution. As ν gets large the t-distribution converges to the
normal.
To derive VaR formula based on student’s t-distribution we apply the deriva-
tion of Dowd (2005, pp. 159-160). Since t-distribution has only one parameter
- degrees of freedom ν, all moments could be written in terms of ν. There-
fore the t-distribution with ν degrees of freedom has mean 0, provided ν > 1;
variance ν/(ν − 2), provided ν > 2; zero skew, provided ν > 3; and kurtosis
of 3(ν − 2)/(ν − 4), provided ν > 4. However, in risk measurement we pre-
fer a generalised t-distribution defined as t(a, b, ν) = a + bt(ν), where a and
b are location parameters set by the user. This generalised t-distribution has
mean a and variance b2ν/(ν − 2), provided that they exist. Skew and kurto-
sis remains the same. Now we can assume that our losses are distributed as
L ∼ t(ν, µ, σ2), E(L) = µ and var(L) = σ2ν/(ν − 2), provided that ν > 2.
Again we fix α ∈ (0, 1), then




σ tα,ν , (3.12)
where µ, σ and ν are obtained from a sample of historical losses.
Huisman et al. (1998) compared performance of student’s-t VaR with nor-
mal VaR using rolling window backtesting method over 5 year period of daily
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S&P 500 returns. The results support the use of heavy tailed student’s t-
distribution. Discrepancies between two methods were more apparent at higher
confidence levels which confirms that empirical returns have heavier tails than
the normal distribution.
3.3.3 Conditional VaR Models
Up to this point we assumed that the loss distribution is unconditional and
we calculated variance of this distribution using the historical moving average
estimate. Dowd (2005, p. 128) mentions several issues of this method. One
of them are equally weighted historical observations in this calculation - if
we have a large data window (for example 1000 days) and an unusually high
event occurs at time t, it will effect our volatility estimate for the next 1000
days, even though the high volatility period has passed a long time ago. One
way to deal with this drawback is to use the exponentially weighted moving
average (EWMA) model, which is based on estimating volatility from historical
returns of the process but the weights decline exponentially as we move further
to the past. Even though the EWMA model performs better than the equally
weighted moving average volatility models, it has only one parameter and that
is fixed over time. Therefore the model do not response to changes in market
conditions satisfyingly. According to Dowd (2005, p. 131), the model will
respond to the recent rises in volatility by predicting it to remain at current
level, not to continue to rise, as would be more possible.
The best way to accommodate the last two stylised facts - heavy tails and
volatility clustering - is to use the generalised autoregressive conditional het-
eroscedasticity (GARCH) model of Bollerslev (1987), which has been developed
from the basic ARCH model suggested by Engle (1982). The introduction of
GARCH model led to the birth of the whole family of GARCH-type models
and even in its basic form with the Gaussian innovations is able to capture
fatter than normal tails. The definition is (McNeil et al. 2005, p. 145):
Definition 3.2 (GARCH(p,q)). Let (Zt)t∈Z be SWN(0,1). The process (Xt)t∈Z is
a GARCH(p,q) process if it is strictly stationary and if it satisfies, for all t ∈ Z
and some strictly positive-valued process (σt)t∈Z, the equations
Xt = σt Zt, σ
2
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where ω > 0, αi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., p, and βj ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., q.
The basic idea behind this model is allowing squared volatility σ2t to depend
on previous p squared values of the process X2t−i (as the ARCH model) and
also on previous q squared volatilities σ2t−i.
The most popular model is GARCH(1,1) with Gaussian innovations:





where ω ≥ 0, α, β ≥ 0 and α+ β < 1. The last condition is to ensure that this
process is covariance-stationary. This model is popular because of its simplicity
and a small number of parameters. Dowd (2005) explains the behaviour of the
process through the parameters α and β - if the value of β is high, the volatility
is persistent and takes long time to change, on the contrary, the high value of
α implies a volatility which reacts very quickly to market changes.
In order to include the GARCH based volatility into our VaR model we
must predict the volatility for the following day. Suppose that our data follow
the GARCH(1,1) model. We therefore fit the model to our data and estimate
model parameters ω, α and β using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). A
prediction of squared standard deviation is then given by:





where Xt is the last value of the process and σ̂t is the last volatility estimate.
Now we derive conditional VaR using McNeil et al. (2005, p. 161). Suppose
that we have the conditional loss distribution FLt+1|Ft (see Section 3.1.2) and
the loss function Lt = −Xt, where (Xt)t∈Z is a process of risk factor changes
(i.e. log returns). Now we assume that the process of losses (Lt)t∈Z follows
a stationary model of the form Lt = µt + σtZt, where Zt is SWN(0,1) and µt
and σt are based on Ft−1 - publicly available information at time t − 1. The
conditional loss distribution is then (McNeil et al. 2005, p. 161):
FLt+1|Ft(l) = P (µt+1 + σt+1Zt+1) ≤ l | F) = G((l − µt+1)/σt+1) (3.16)
Then the conditional VaR estimate is (McNeil et al. 2005, p. 161):
V aRtα = µt+1 + σt+1 qα(G) (3.17)
where qα(G) is an α-quantile of the function G and µt+1 and σt+1 are the
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estimates of mean and volatility. In the conditional normal VaR model qα(G) =
Φ−1(α), in the conditional student’s-t VaR qα(G) = tα,ν where ν are degrees of
freedom estimated from the t-GARCH model. Moreover, we have to scale the
quantile by the factor
√
(ν − 2)/ν. Hence, we have:
V aRtα = µt+1 + σt+1 Φ
−1(α) (3.18)
V aRtα = µt+1 + σt+1
√
(ν − 2)/ν tα,ν (3.19)
where (3.18) represents the normal GARCH VaR and (3.19) represents the
t-GARCH VaR.
3.4 Historical VaR
Historical simulation is known to be one of the most popular among risk man-
agers. Pérignon & Smith (2010b) in their survey of the level of VaR disclosure
find out that 73% of the banks that disclose their methodology are using (un-
conditional) historical simulation. This popularity is according to Pérignon
& Smith (2010b) caused by the size and complexity of the trading positions
- banks have to deal with thousands of risk-factors and hence the parametric
methods are difficult to use in practice. Another reason for the high popularity
is the smoothness of risk forecasts. Because the unconditional historical simu-
lation reacts slowly to changes in volatility, the VaR estimates does not change
much from one day to the next.
As we mentioned earlier in the section (3.2.2) the historical simulation ap-
proach does not make any distribution assumptions. On the other hand, it
requires significantly large amount of historical data to produce accurate re-
sults. Crouhy et al. (2006, pp. 165-166) describes the three steps involved in
HS calculation:
1. Taking a sample of actual daily risk factor changes over a given period of
time.
2. Applying those daily changes to the current value of the risk factors and
revaluing the current portfolio as many times as the number of days in
the historical sample.
3. Constructing the histogram of portfolio values and obtaining VaR as a
1− α percentile.
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To describe this method mathematically we again use McNeil et al. (2005,
pp. 50-52) framework. The first step is getting a set of historically simulated
losses by applying the loss operator to each of our historical observation:
{L̃s = l[t](Xs) : s = t− n+ 1, ..., t}, (3.20)
where the values L̃s show “what would happen to the current portfolio if the
risk factor changes on day s were to recur” (McNeil et al. 2005, p. 50), and n is
a number of historical observations in our sample. We can further distinguish
between an unconditional and a conditional method. In the former we assume
that the process of risk-factor changes Xs is stationary with distribution func-
tion FX. The latter could be done by several extended methods like the one
described in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Unconditional HS
Now assume that we have an unconditional series (3.20). Common method to
estimate VaR in practice is called empirical quantile estimation, where we use
a sample quantiles of our data to estimate VaR. Let
L̃n,n ≤ ... ≤ L̃1,n (3.21)
be the ordered values of the data in (3.20). Then we can estimate V aRα(L)
as L̃[n(1−α)],n, where [n(1 − α)] is the largest integer not exceeding n(1 − α).
In other words, we just order observations in our sample a take n(1 − α)-th
observation as a VaR estimate.
This method is criticized by Pritsker (2006) because it assigns the same
weight to each historical return which is the same as the i.i.d. assumption.
In light of the stylised facts of financial time series presented in Section 3.3,
especially the volatility clustering, is this unrealistic. Furthermore, Pritsker
(2006) shows this disadvantage on a portfolio held during the 1987 equity crash.
Although there were one significant fall in the portfolio and few high positive
values, the HS approach still uses n(1−α)-th lowest return, which is obviously
not the lowest return observed on October 19, 1987 and does not take into
account high positive returns at all.
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3.4.2 Historical VaR with GARCH Volatility
The major drawback of the historical simulation model is its backward looking
approach. We assume that the future changes in our portfolio will be drawn
from a historical distribution of returns. On the other hand we do not have to
make any further assumptions about distribution, which is the issue of para-
metric models. Another problem are equally weighted historical returns, which
was mentioned above. If the volatility is high now but low in preceding months,
current volatility estimate will be undervalued and vice versa (because in our
historical distribution there is large number of low-volatility days compared to
high-volatility days). The parametric models, on the other hand, allows for
incorporating GARCH volatility which is an advantage over historical simula-
tion.
Hull & White (1998) suggested to incorporate GARCH modelled volatility
into the historical simulation model. Suppose that we have a historical distri-
bution of certain market variable but each historical observation rt is rescaled
using GARCH volatility. If the σ2t is the historical GARCH estimate of the
daily variance made for day t at the end of day t − 1, and the most recent
GARCH estimate of the daily variance is σ2N . Hull & White (1998) assume
that the probability distribution of rt/σt is stationary and therefore replaces rt
by r′t where:




and daily variance is estimated via GARCH(1,1) model defined as 3.14.
This approach is sometimes referred as Volatility-weighted Historical Sim-
ulation (Dowd 2005, pp. 94 - 95) because of the adjustment of returns rt. If
the value of estimated volatility at time t is greater than current volatility es-
timate, r′t < rt and vice versa. The VaR is then estimated in the usual way,
i.e. obtaining a (1− p) critical value of the probability distribution of r′t.
3.5 Backtesting
Suppose that we are estimating VaR recurrently over a certain period of time.
We should be able evaluate its performance somehow. This is done by ex-post
comparison of the VaR estimates with actual losses observed on the same day
- the process known as backtesting. VaR is defined as a 1 − α quantile of the
underlying loss distribution thus we expect that there is a probability of α that
this amount will not be exceeded. In other words, the probability that the VaR
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is violated is 1− α. Let




be an indicator notation for violation (McNeil et al. 2005, p. 55). Then this in-
dicators should be Bernoulli distributed with success probability corresponding
to 1− α, where α is the desired confidence level.
We would like to test if the empirical probability of violation correspond to
the chosen confidence level α. In other words, whether, for example, 1% VaR
really produce 1% of losses higher than the estimate. This could by done via
unconditional coverage test.
Another issue we want to test is the volatility clustering. Even if the model
passes the unconditional coverage test, it does not automatically mean that it
is good. Danielsson (2011, p. 153) presents an example: what if all violations
were squeezed into few weeks during some stress period? In such a situation
the model will pass the unconditional coverage test (provided that only few
violations occurred before the stress period) but the risk of bankruptcy is still
very high. Within a good model the occurrences of violations should be spread
out over a whole period of time. Therefore we would like to test independence
of violations and this could be done via independence test of Christoffersen
(1998).
3.5.1 Unconditional coverage test
We explained the basic idea behind this test, which was suggested by Kupiec
(1995), earlier. Now we look at this test more closely using Christoffersen
(1998) as the major source of information.
Suppose that we have a series {Lt}Tt=1 of daily losses and a corresponding
sequence of out-of-sample interval forecasts {V aRt−1α }Tt=1 where V aRt−1α is the
VaR estimate for a day t made on the day t − 1 at given significance level α.
Then the indicator function It is defined as:
It =
1 if Lt > V aRt−1α0 if Lt ≤ V aRt−1α (3.24)
Clearly, It indicates violations of VaR (Lt is equal to one if its value lies inside
the interval and zero otherwise).
According to Christoffersen (1998), {V aRt−1α }Tt=1 has correct unconditional
coverage if the sequence {It} is i.i.d. Bernoulli distributed with parameter p.
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In other words, if the number of VaR violations is the same as the expected
probability of violation, i.e. (1 − α) times a total number of observations.
Hence, we can write the null hypothesis as:
H0 : {It}
iid∼ B(p),∀t, (3.25)
where p is the probability of a violation.
We can test the null hypothesis through the use of a Likelihood Ratio (LR)
test, provided that It, It−1, . . . are independent. The likelihood function is given




(1− p)1−ItpIt = (1− p)v0pv1 , (3.26)
where v1 =
∑T
1 It and v0 = 1 − v1. Under the null hypothesis p = q = 1 − α
and the likelihood functions is:
L(q; I1, . . . , IT ) = (1− q)v0qv1 , (3.27)
and under the alternative p = π = v1/(v0 + v1) with likelihood function:
L(π; I1, . . . , IT ) = (1− π)v0πv1 . (3.28)
The likelihood ratio test is then:
LRUC = −2 log
(
L(q; I1, . . . , IT )








As Christoffersen (1998) points out, this test does not have any power to iden-
tify clusters. Only thing that matter is the total number of violations, i.e.
number of ones in the indicator sequence. Their order does not matter.
3.5.2 Conditional coverage test
Christoffersen (1998) stresses that testing for the correct unconditional coverage
is insufficient for the data that exhibit volatility clusters such as daily losses
(returns). He suggest using two additional tests to overcome this deficiency
- the independence test and the jointly test for independence and conditional
coverage - giving a complete test of correct conditional coverage.
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We begin with the independence test. Let
pij = P (It = j|It−1 = i), i, j ∈ {0, 1} (3.30)
be the probability of two consecutive events based on the values of i and j. If
i = j = 1, p11 is the probability of consecutive violations. Similarly p01 is the
probability of violation if the VaR on the previous day was not violated, and
so on.
Christoffersen (1998) tests independence against specific first-order Markov








with the approximate likelihood function:
L(Π1; I1, . . . , IT ) = (1− p01)n00pn0101 (1− p11)n10pn1111 (3.32)
where nij is the number of observations where i is followed by j. Then we
maximize this function to obtain maximum likelihood estimate of Π1:
Π̂1 =





Under the null hypothesis there is no volatility clustering, therefore the proba-
bility that VaR will be violated does not depend on whether or not there was
a violation on the previous day (p11 = p01 = p2). The transition matrix and







L(Π2; I1, . . . , IT ) = (1− p2)n00+n10pn01+n112 (3.35)
and the ML estimate of Π2 is
Π̂2 =
n01 + n11
n00 + n10 + n01 + n11
. (3.36)
The likelihood ratio test is then calculated using likelihood functions (3.32) and
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(3.35):
LRIND = −2 log
(
L(Π1; I1, . . . , IT )
L(Π2; I1, . . . , IT )
)
asy∼ χ21. (3.37)
As Christoffersen (1998) remarks, this test does not depend on the probability
of VaR violation p and test only the independence of violations.
However, there is one main problem with this test, which is mentioned by
Danielsson (2011, p. 156), and that is the particularly specified independence.
The departures from independence will not be detected if the probability de-
pend on a violation two or more days ago, but not on the yesterday’s violation.
The jointly test for independence and conditional coverage combines the
unconditional coverage test and the independence test into a complete test of
conditional coverage. The likelihood ratio test is:
LRCC = −2 log
(
L(p; I1, . . . , IT )
L(Π2; I1, . . . , IT )
)
asy∼ χ22. (3.38)
There is also following relationship between all three tests:
LRCC = LRUN + LRIND. (3.39)
However, this joint test is not preferred to previously derived tests as it may
seem. The thing is, that, according to Danielsson (2011, p. 159), this test has
less power to reject a VaR model satisfying only either unconditional coverage
property or independence property. It could happen in such a case that this
test will fail to reject the model which exhibits correct unconditional coverage





The performance of selected VaR models is tested on a portfolio represented by
the S&P 500 equity index. Hence, the portfolio is influenced by the single risk
factor which represents top 500 companies in leading industries of the United
States and is known to capture 75% coverage of U.S. equities which makes it
the best single gauge of the U.S. stock markets (Standard & Poor’s Financial
Services 2013).
Our dataset includes 5796 daily log returns from the beginning of 1990 to
the end of 2012. This period selection was not random. During the past two
decades there has been a rapid development in a financial engineering, i.e. an
expansion of the off-balance-sheet products such as derivatives and swaps, as
well as a development in the regulatory framework (the first Basel Accord was
implemented in 1992). Moreover this data period covers three important crises:
the 1997 Asian crisis; the 2000 dot-com bubble; and the 2007-2008 sub-prime
mortgage crisis. This is important in a stressed VaR calculation because we
need a one year long period of a significant financial stress.
In Table 4.1 there are summary statistics for the S&P 500 index. As we can
see, the mean is statistically not different from zero hence we can assume that
µ = 0 in all our models. Negative skewness implies long left tail of a return
series and kurtosis of 11.47 suggests that a series is heavy tailed. The biggest
loss of 9.47% was observed on 15 October 2008, only 2 days after the biggest
return of 10.96%. This is further evidence of volatility clustering.
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We calculate VaR using 6 different models, three of them are conditional and
three are unconditional. Theoretical framework for each model is in Sections
3.3 and 3.4. Here we just briefly summarize each model’s features:
Normal (N-UC). The standard unconditional parametric VaR model which as-
sumes normally distributed risk-factor changes (i.e. daily log returns) as
described in Section 3.3.1.
Student’s-t (t-UC). The unconditional parametric VaR model which assumes
student’s-t distributed risk-factor changes as described in Section 3.3.2.
Historical Simulation (HS). Basic unconditional empirical method of VaR esti-
mation as described in Section 3.4.1.
Normal-GARCH (N-G). A conditional version of the normal VaR method which
assumes conditionally normally distributed risk factor changes (see Equa-
tion 3.18). To estimate the conditional variance of the risk-factor changes,
the GARCH(1,1) model with normal innovation is used.
Student’s-t-GARCH (t-G). The conditional student’s-t VaR with variance esti-
mated using the GARCH(1,1) model with student’s-t innovations (see
Equation 3.19).
Volatility weighted HS (WHS). The extended conditional version of historical
simulation as described in Section 3.4.2. Again, the GARCH(1,1) model
is fitted to historical losses to estimate the conditional variance of the
risk-factor changes.
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4.3 Methodology
The purpose of this thesis is to assess whether stressed VaR, as it is defined
in the latest Basel amendment, is able to capture risk efficiently. In order to
do it, we divide our research into three steps. In the first step we estimate
an ordinary VaR models and comment its performance, then we add stressed
VaR, and finally we try to implement these risk measures into the capital
requirements computation.
4.3.1 VaR Estimation
In order to evaluate an ability of each VaR model to capture market risk we
examine its performance over a period in the past. Hence, we apply backtest-
ing method described in Danielsson (2011, pp. 143 - 147). This approach is
visualised in Figure 4.1. Firstly, we take a first estimation window of length
WE and use the data in it to estimate VaR for day t = WE + 1. Then we move
our window by one day and repeat the estimation and so on, until the data
are exhausted. We have decided to set WE = 500 days because longer periods
could cause problems for unconditional models (see Dowd 2005, p. 128). Al-
together, we have (T −WE) = 5296 VaR estimates. Note that the last VaR
forecast is made on day T − 1 for the day T . We do not estimate VaR for the
day T + 1 because we do not have an actual loss observed on this day in our
dataset and hence we cannot compare it with VaR forecast.







t = 1 t = T
t = 1 t = WE
t = 2 t = WE + 1
t = 3 t = WE + 2






Source: (Danielsson 2011, p. 144)
Hereafter, we record the violations on each day (VaR is violated if actual loss
on corresponding day is higher than estimated VaR) and obtain the violation
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ratio. The closer to one this ratio is the better, but without formal test we
cannot ascertain whether values not equal to one are statistically significant.
However, Danielsson (2011, p. 147) mentions a rule of thumb: if V R ∈ 〈0.8, 1.2〉
it is probably a good estimate and V R < 0.5 or V R > 1.5 suggest that the
model is imprecise. This analysis help us to get basic information about each
model before we apply the unconditional coverage test and the independence
test.
The unconditional coverage test and the independence test are discussed in
Section 3.5.1 and Section 3.5.2, respectively. Here we just summarize the null
and the alternative hypotheses.
The unconditional coverage test. Under the null hypothesis the observed num-
ber of violations is the same as the expected number of violations which is
equal to (1−α) times the number of observations. Under the alternative
this number is either lower or higher than it was expected.
The independence test. Under the null hypothesis the probability of VaR vio-
lation does not depend on whether or not there was a violation on the
previous day. Under the alternative there is a dependence and therefore
model probably does not account for the volatility clusters.
We afterwards graphically evaluate each model performance during the 2008
crisis because we believe that this period represents the worst segment of our
dataset.
4.3.2 Stressed VaR Estimation
Given lack of academic literature concerning SVaR estimation, this part is
undoubtedly the most challenging. Lets split the process into two steps. First
step is a selection of a period that represents a significant stress for institutions
portfolio. This period should be 250 days long. Then we use this period as an
estimation window (similarly as in VaR estimation) for Stress VaR forecast.
Whole process is visualised in Figure 4.2. Suppose that the identified stress
period for time t ∈ 〈tB, tD) is the period 〈tA, tB〉; and for time t ≥ tD it is
〈tC , tD〉. This means that, for example, on the days t1, t2 ∈ 〈tB, tD) we calculate
SVaR using the first stress period. And on the day t3 ≥ tD we use the second
stress period as the estimation window. Notice that SVaR(t1 + 1) is the same
as SVaR(t2 +1) since the portfolio is constant over time and both estimates are
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Figure 4.2: SVaR Methodology





calculated from the same stress period. This quite simplifies SVaR estimation
- we only need to forecast SVaR once for each stress period.
Stress Period Identification
At first, we have to identify a stress period. According to the Revisions to
the Basel II market risk framework, we need 250 days long (approximately 12
months) period of financial stress (more in Section 2.1.4). European Banking
Authority (2012) suggests two approaches of the stress period identification: a
risk-factor based approach and a VaR based approach.
The first one consists of a identifying the risk factors relevant to institution’s
portfolio and finding a period of highest volatility. Since we have only one risk
factor in this thesis - the equity index - we just find the period when the
standard deviation was the highest.
The VaR based approach identifies the stress period by running either full
VaR model or an approximation over a historical period. The stress period is
then a period of 250 days preceding the highest VaR estimate.
We chose the former approach for two reasons: (1) the stress period will
be the same for all six models, and (2) the SVaR is calculated from 250 long
estimation window but the VaR models assumes 500 days long estimation win-
dow therefore the highest VaR estimate would not imply the highest SVaR
estimate. A solution for this could be running VaR model based on 250 days
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long period but it would be time demanding and the first option is sufficient
for our research.
SVaR models
Once the stress period has been identified, a model for SVaR calculation must
be chosen. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009b) does not
prescribe any particular model therefore we can freely choose any method for
VaR estimation from Section 4.2. To preserve simplicity we will retain con-
sistency between VaR and SVaR estimates. In other words, we will not, for
example, add normal SVaR to student’s-t VaR and so on.
4.3.3 VaR and SVaR within the Basel framework










where α = 99% and mc is multiplication factor which has minimum value of
3 plus an additional factor k which rises according to model’s performance in
a backtest, i.e. the number of violations in preceding 250 days. Value of the
factor k is obtained from Table 4.2. Consequently, we obtain minimal capital
Table 4.2: Basel II multiplication factor
Zone Violations Value of factor k Multiplication factor mc
Green Zone 0 - 4 0.00 3.00





Red Zone ≥ 10 1.00 4.00
Source: (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006, p. 321)
requirements once again but within the Basel 2.5 framework, i.e. we account


















where ms has again minimum value of 3 plus a factor k obtained from Table 4.2.
Note that backtesting results are based on VaR performance only and not
SVaR.
We do not use 10-days long holding period as it is required by BCBS in the
Basel II (and the Basel 2.5) but we use 1-day period instead. One reason is
that the daily estimates are better for purposes of our thesis and, more impor-
tantly, a calculation of the 10-day VaR (and SVaR) is problematic. Danielsson
(2002) criticize both possibilities of this computation; the first one is using
non-overlapping 10 day returns to forecast VaR but this require 10 times larger
dataset to produce statistically accurate results, the second option is applying
the square− root− of − time scaling rule which is recommended by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2009b). However, Danielsson (2002) ar-
gues that this rule depends on strong distribution assumption such as normally
distributed returns and time-independent volatility. This is obviously not true
and using this rule for scaling conditional VaR models does not make any sense
which pose a serious problems for risk managers who are using these models.
Nevertheless, this problem is more complex and it is not a topic of this thesis.
We afterwards assess the model’s performance using several criteria:
1. An amount of capital requirements.
2. Percentage of time when the model was in a green, yellow and red zone
(see Table 4.2).
3. A range of capital requirements, i.e. minimum and maximum values.
4. An increase in requirements caused by applying new rules.
Obviously, the models with low capital requirements and with contemporaneous
low number of violations (high number of days in a green zone) are preferred.
A wide range suggest that the model better reacts to market movements, on
the contrary a narrow range imply that model probably fails to capture these
movements. The last criterion is rather informative.
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4.4 VaR Estimation
All VaR models were estimated and numbers of violations for each year are
collected in Table A.1. This section is divided into two parts, the first part is
devoted to unconditional and the second to conditional models.
4.4.1 Unconditional models
The violation ratios and volatilities of all three unconditional modes are in
Table 4.3. We also include test statistics and p-values of the unconditional
coverage test and the independence test.
Table 4.3: Performance of the unconditional VaR models
Unc. Coverage Independence
Model VR Volatility TS P-value TS P-Value
N-UC 2.0770 0.0106 47.3504 0.0000 63.0047 0.0000
t-UC 1.4917 0.0151 11.2355 0.0008 32.4913 0.0000
HS 1.4162 0.0149 8.2055 0.0042 25.3294 0.0000
Source: author’s computations.
The normal model performed worst of all. The violation ratio is higher than
2 which is well over suggested value 1.2. On the other hand, the volatility of
the normal VaR is the lowest of all unconditional models. In this light is not
surprising that we can strongly reject the null hypothesis of the unconditional
coverage test. Moreover, the null of the independence test is also rejected which
indicate that this model fail to capture volatility clusters.
Although the student’s-t VaR shows better results, the violation ratio is
still almost 1.5, which suggest that the model is imprecise. And this is fur-
ther confirmed by both the unconditional coverage and the independence tests,
where the null hypotheses are rejected.
The Historical simulation performed the best of all unconditional models
but its results are similar to student’s-t model and far from being good. The
model did not pass the unconditional coverage test nor the independence test.
Now lets focus on the 2007-2008 crisis to show the ability of the uncondi-
tional models to respond to abrupt volatility surges.
The normal VaR resulted in 15 violations in 2007 followed by 28 violations
in 2008 (see Table A.1) - that is more than 10 times higher then it is expected.
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Figure 4.3: Normal VaR estimate during the 2008 crisis. There were










The situation is captured in Figure 4.3. It is apparent that the model does
not react to sudden jumps in volatility during 2008 and during the first half of
2009. Moreover, when the volatility increases rapidly in the second half of 2008,
VaR forecasts move upwards only very slowly and reach its maximal value not
before the worst period is over.
Although the other two unconditional methods performed little better, dur-
ing this high-volatile period both models suffer from the similar problems as
the normal VaR - very slow reaction to sudden changes in volatility.
The Student’s-t VaR performance is shown in Figure 4.4. The number of
violations is slightly lower than in the previous case - 12 in 2007 and 17 in 2008
- but it is still very high. This results suggest that only accounting for heavy
tails which are present in financial data is not enough if we base our model on
the unconditional distribution.
The historical simulation method resulted in 11 violations in 2007 and 18
violations in 2008. The model reacts to the crisis similarly as the previous two
as it is shown in Figure 4.5. We observe here an issue discussed by Pritsker
(2006) - despite numerous volatility jumps in 2007 VaR estimate remains low
because the 10th lowest return which correspond to 0.01 quantile is still higher
than the returns that originated from these jumps. Furthermore, from the
second quarter of 2009, when the markets resumed its normal conditions, VaR
estimate remains high. Explanation for this is identical: the 10th largest value
is now much higher than it was before the crisis due to the many volatile days
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Figure 4.4: Student’s-t VaR estimate during the 2008 crisis. There










in the second half of 2008. And this will not change until this period is not
present in the estimation window, i.e. 500 days later.
Figure 4.5: HS VaR estimate during the 2008 crisis There were 11










All the unconditional models suffer from similar issue - inability to suffi-
ciently quickly react to changes in volatility. Not only causes problems sudden
volatility increases, but also the returning to the normal market conditions is
not followed by lowering the estimates which leads to overestimation of risk
during low volatility periods. Evidence for this is clearly visible in Table A.1 -
there is no single violation from 2004 till 2006 for all three unconditional mod-
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els (preceded by one violation in 2003). This results correspond to empirical
evidence of Berkowitz & O’Brien (2002) and Pérignon et al. (2008) who discov-
ered that banks tend to overstate market risk. However, these researches are
outdated because they do not account for the 2008 crisis where these models
failed.
If the risk is underestimated during crises periods and overestimated when
the markets are in normal conditions, the idea of supplementing this measure
with some additional stressed VaR model does not seem very reasonable.
4.4.2 Conditional models
Now lets look at the conditional models. Again, we collected the violations
rations, volatilities, test statistics and p-values of both the conditional coverage
and independence tests in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Performance of the conditional VaR models
Unc. Coverage Independence
Model VR Volatility TS P-value TS P-Value
N-G 1.9826 0.01347 40.167 0.0000 23.839 0.0000
t-G 1.2651 0.01509 3.469 0.0626 0.027 0.8706
WHS 1.0952 0.01843 0.470 0.4930 0.183 0.6692
Source: author’s computations.
Although the normal GARCH VaR performed better than the unconditional
normal model, the volatility ratio is still almost two, which is worse result
than the unconditional student’s-t VaR and the historical simulation. Also we
can reject the null hypothesis of the unconditional coverage test and of the
independence test. The former is not surprising given the volatility ratio but
he latter is rather unexpected since the GARCH model was used.
The GARCH model with student’s-t innovations resulted in lower volatility
ratio than the normal model; although it is still over 1.2, there are only 14 more
violations within 18 years than it was expected, which is very good result. We
cannot reject the null hypothesis of the unconditional coverage at 1% nor 5%
significance levels but we manage to reject it at 10% level. Also we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of the independence test which suggests that the
model managed to capture volatility clusters.
The volatility weighted historical simulation model outperformed the other
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two conditional as well as all the unconditional models. The volatility ratio
lies in the desired interval and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the
unconditional coverage test which means that this model almost succeeded in
covering estimated number of violations. Moreover, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of the independence test.
Figure 4.6: Normal GARCH VaR estimate during the 2008 crisis












During the 2007-2008 crisis the normal model does not performed very well
concerning the number of violations - 11 in 2007 and 11 in 2008. However,
from Figure 4.6 we can see that responds better to volatility cluster in the
second half of 2008 than the unconditional models. The problem is that the
normal distribution is thin-tailed and use of heavy-tailed distribution such as
student’s-t would be more appropriate.
The Student’s-t and the volatility weighted HS models performed much bet-
ter during this crisis period. Although both the models resulted in 8 violations
in 2007, in 2008 there are only 4 and 3 violations for the student’s-t and the
volatility weighted HS models, respectively. As we can see in Figure 4.7 and in
Figure 4.8 the models quickly reacts to volatility cluster in 2008.
Generally, the conditional models outperformed the unconditional. This is
especially visible during the crisis period when the unconditional models failed
to sufficiently quickly respond to volatility surge. On the contrary, not only
more quickly the conditional models responded, but also after the crisis the
estimates did not remain to high.
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Figure 4.7: Student’s GARCH VaR estimate during the 2008 crisis












Figure 4.8: Volatility weighted HS estimate during the 2008 crisis
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4.5 Stressed VaR Estimation
First issue in stressed VaR estimation is finding an appropriate stress period.
From our dataset we identified five such periods using approach defined in Sec-
tion 4.3.2, such that each new stress period has a higher standard deviation
than the previous one. We afterwards calculated stressed VaR with the es-
timation window from this period for all six models (both unconditional and
conditional). Results are collected in Table 4.5.
An issue occurred in SVaR estimation for fourth stress period. The his-
torical simulation, the t-GARCH, and the volatility weighted HS resulted in
lower SVaR number than for the previous period. An explanation for this is
that higher standard deviation during this stress period does not imply higher
estimate from the historical simulation. Similarly for the other two models.
For further computations, we will use the higher values.
Table 4.5: Stressed VaR
Stress period SVaR
Start End Std. N-UC t-UC HS N-G t-G WHS
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
10/07/1990 03/07/1991 1.08 2.50 2.60 3.04 2.39 2.41 3.22
23/07/1998 20/07/1999 1.42 3.30 3.61 3.91 2.80 2.98 3.96
10/10/2000 11/10/2001 1.46 3.40 3.69 4.41 3.45 3.67 4.28
01/05/2002 28/04/2003 1.74 4.04 4.12 3.91 3.52 3.54 3.52
22/07/2008 17/07/2009 2.88 6.70 7.99 9.35 4.02 4.30 6.27
Source: author’s computations.
Notice that there is a big discrepancy between the last period, which cor-
respond to the recent crisis, and those before. Explanation for this is simple:
since 1990 there has not been such crisis as the one in 2008. Obviously, we could
extend our dataset to the late 80’ to include the 1987 equity crash or even more
into the past. However, this would cause problems because the stress period
has to be relevant to institution’s portfolio and using such old data would re-
quire using proxies for position which not existed in those periods and this may
result in very different SVaR estimates (see Standard & Poor’s Financial Ser-
vices 2012). We consequently add SVaR numbers to our VaR estimates from
the Section 4.4 and collected the numbers of violations in the Table 4.6. The
number of violations decreased rapidly for each model therefore it does not
make sense to conduct any formal tests (and it is not even possible with such a
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Table 4.6: VaR and SVaR comparison
Violations
Model Expected VaR VaR + SVaR
N-UC 52.96 110 6
t-UC 52.96 79 4
HS 52.96 75 4
N-G 52.96 105 3
t-G 52.96 67 2
WHS 52.96 58 1
Source: author’s computations.
small dataset). We present it here though, because it shows the enormous size
of this buffer.
4.6 VaR and Basel Rules
We calculated minimal capital requirements using Formulas 4.1 and 4.2 and col-
lected results in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, respectively. In these tables there are only
average statistics for whole period; yearly results for each model are collected
in Tables A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, and A.7 in Appendix A.
Table 4.7: The Basel II minimal capital requirements
Model Mean Min Max Green Yellow Red
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
N-UC 8.51 3.82 20.71 54.4 33.8 11.8
t-UC 9.81 4.39 27.69 69.8 21.4 8.8
HS 9.66 4.26 27.79 73.4 17.9 8.7
N-G 8.27 3.44 40.58 51.4 42.0 6.6
t-G 8.39 3.69 34.84 76.9 23.1 0.0
WHS 8.99 3.49 41.53 82.1 17.9 0.0
Source: author’s computations.
The unconditional normal model resulted in the lowest capital requirements
among the unconditional models; however, the model was almost 12% of time
in the red zone which is worst of all models. Unambiguously worst period is
the 2008 crisis - the model was in the red zone for whole year 2008 followed by
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202 days in 2009 (see Table A.2). This failure is not surprising given model’s
performance during this crisis discussed in Section 4.4.1.
Minimal capital requirements computed from the student’s-t and the HS
model are higher than those from the normal. This is given by using fat-tailed
(t-UC) and empirical (HS) distributions. Nevertheless, both the models were
in the red zone almost 9% of time and all these violations were in 2007 - 2009
period.
The conditional models achieved to capture the volatility cluster in 2008
much better. As we can see in Table 4.7, average capital requirements are
generally lower whilst maximal observed values are far higher. By contrast,
the highest value of capital requirements computed using unconditional models
is 27.8 (HS) and 27.7 (t-UC) and this is even further raised by an additional
factor k.
Despite the lowest capital requirements, the normal GARCH model fell into
the red zone in 6.6% of time. Furthermore this model was in the green zone
only 51% of time, which is the lowest of all models. On the contrary, the
student’s-t GARCH model as well as volatility weighted HS model managed
to avoid the red zone entirely. The former also resulted in the second lowest
capital requirements.
Table 4.8: The Basel 2.5 minimal capital requirements
Model Mean Min Max Increase
(%) (%) (%) (%)
N-UC 21.23 11.33 47.48 149.47
t-UC 23.04 12.18 54.57 134.86
HS 24.55 13.39 61.59 154.14
N-G 18.68 10.63 54.67 125.88
t-G 18.59 10.94 45.84 121.57
WHS 22.01 13.16 54.37 122.58
Source: author’s computations.
The implementation of the Basel 2.5 rules caused substantial increase in
the minimal capital requirements. As can be seen in Table 4.8, this surge
is at average highest for the unconditional models, especially the normal and
the HS. The average capital requirements are now lowest for the conditional
student’s-t model, moreover, its maximal value of 45.8% is also the lowest thus
this model is preferable to the volatility weighted HS which has higher average
capital requirements and maximal value of 10% higher. However, this method
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performed the best in the initial VaR analysis (see Section 4.4) and this increase
is probably caused by higher SVaR estimates (see Table 4.5).
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Source: author’s computations.
The situation during the 2008 crisis is showed in Figures B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4,
B.5, B.6 in Appendix B. In each figure there are both the Basel II and Basel 2.5
minimum capital requirements. When looking at unconditional models perfor-
mance it is apparent that the last stressed period have impacted the models
only when the worst period was over which was already too late. Consequently
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the minimum capital requirements remained unnecessarily high. Whereas the
conditional t-GARCH VaR managed to reach the same level during the second
half of 2008 but without any SVaR enhancements (see Figure 4.9). Similar
situation is shown in Figure 4.10 where we compared widely used HS method
under the new Basel 2.5 proposals with the volatility weighted HS within the
old framework. This is clear evidence that the SVaR number added to the
parametric model based on unconditional distributions only overestimates the
risk during the normal market conditions whilst the same results during the
crises periods could be achieved via the conditional t-GARCH or the volatility
weighted HS model without this overestimation.
4.7 Summary
We presented here a clear evidence against usage of the unconditional models,
especially under normality assumption. All these models failed in a conducted
backtest and thus were penalised in the minimum capital requirements cal-
culation. Furthermore, these models tend to overestimate risk in a common
market conditions which lead to overstating of the regulatory capital. Con-
versely, during the crisis the models reacted only slowly and thus the minimum
capital requirements remained at similar levels which resulted in large number
of violations and possible inability of a bank to meet the losses.
On the other hand, the conditional models (with an exception of normal
GARCH model) performed way better. Surprising results was achieved by the
volatility weighted historical simulation of Hull & White (1998) although this
model have not been used in any recent study (to the author’s best knowledge).
This model even managed to outperform the student’s-t GARCH VaR regard-
ing the number of violations and conditional coverage test. However, the latter
model resulted in slightly lower minimum capital requirements which could be
an advantage for many risk managers.
The addition of SVaR creates such a buffer that most of the days stay
without violations. The danger is that this can bring false sense of security to
bank before a huge loss hits them.
We do not see any improvements by an addition of the stressed VaR into the
minimum capital requirements framework. When applied on the unconditional
models, it only results in even higher overstating of risk during standard market
conditions and during the crisis the same amount of capital could be estimated
via both conditional models mentioned above.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Recently proposed changes to the capital adequacy framework for market risk,
as a reaction to the extensive losses which occurred in the course of the 2008
financial turmoil, have raised essential questions regarding its ability to forego
such a high volatile periods. Whilst the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision believe that further enhancement of the minimum capital requirements
through a newly required stressed Value-at-Risk number, calculated from a one
year long period of financial stress, will help to eliminate losses caused by vig-
orous movements in financial markets, we presented here an empirical evidence
that such an approach is not optimal. Furthermore, many issues discussed by
academics in recent past decade remains.
We examined a performance of six models for Value-at-Risk estimation on
approximately 20 years of daily financial returns of the S&P 500 index. More-
over, we graphically investigated their behaviour during the recent crisis. The
normal as well as other two unconditional models proved to be insufficient for
daily VaR estimation. Although fat tailed student’s-t distribution and histor-
ical simulation showed little improvements in VaR performance, all uncondi-
tional models suffer from similar problems and that is slow reaction to sudden
volatility surge on the onset of the crisis. Furthermore, the GARCH model with
normal innovations did not produce desired improvement compared to uncon-
ditional models. This is further evidence against the normal distribution. On
the other hand, the student’s-t conditional model as well as volatility weighted
historical simulation of Hull & White (1998) proved to be more effective. The
latter almost managed to cover expected number of violations and both models
succeeded in capturing volatility clusters.
The most important contribution of this thesis is a practical implementa-
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tion, assessment and real-life performance evaluation of VaR models, discussed
above, to the latest Basel capital adequacy framework. Although a few authors
examined impact of these proposals, we are, to the author’s best knowledge,
the first who attempted to evaluate its performance in a backtest. Our research
is carried out as if the these new proposals have existed since 1990 and this
allowed us to assess whether these extensions of the minimum capital require-
ments fulfilled aims set by the BCBS.
We calculated stressed VaR via the same models as for daily VaR computa-
tion but using data from five stress periods. Each new stress period had higher
standard deviation than the preceding one which made them a better repre-
sentation of financial stress. Hereafter, we implemented each VaR and SVaR
model into the old Basel II and the new Basel 2.5 minimum capital framework.
Results confirmed unsuitability of the unconditional distributions to compute
VaR. Although an average capital ratios were slightly higher to those obtained
from conditional models, the large number of violations especially in the recent
crisis resulted in entering the red zone and thus further increased the capital
requirements through the penalty factor. Moreover, enhancing the minimum
requirements by the SVaR led to even higher required capital. The average
increase was between 135% to 155% which is higher than the 110% presented
in the quantitative impact study of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2009a).
On the other hand, the conditional models (with an exception of normal
GARCH) performed way better. The minimum capital requirements were, in
average, lower and both models avoided entering the Red Zone (i.e. there
were less than 10 violations in preceding 250 days) entirely and thus were not
further penalised. Furthermore, those models managed to predict the same
amount of required capital during the crisis as unconditional models but with-
out any additional enhancements such as SVaR and, more importantly, without
overestimation of risk during the low volatile periods.
Therefore, we do not see any improvements by adding the SVaR to the
current daily VaR, because the same level of capital can be obtained via some
conditional methods, such as stundent’s-t GARCH or volatility weighted histor-
ical simulation within the old framework. We showed that this enhancement
produces much higher capital requirements while the real problems such as
wrongly assumed normal distribution of daily returns or using unconditional
distribution instead of conditional still remains.
Although we managed to cover wide range of models we simplified our
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research by assuming univariate portfolio represented by single stock index.
However, it is known that during the crisis the correlations among risk factors
tend to rise. Therefore there is a possibility of conducting similar research but
allowing portfolio to depend on several risk factors such as exchange rates or
interest rates.
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Appendix A
Tables




Year Expected N-UC t-UC HS N-G t-G WHS
1992 2.54 0 0 0 1 1 1
1993 2.53 2 2 2 4 2 3
1994 2.52 9 8 6 9 8 6
1995 2.52 3 1 0 3 2 2
1996 2.54 10 8 6 10 5 4
1997 2.53 8 7 7 6 5 2
1998 2.52 7 6 5 6 4 4
1999 2.52 0 0 0 2 0 0
2000 2.52 4 3 3 4 2 2
2001 2.48 3 3 3 3 2 2
2002 2.52 5 4 4 4 3 3
2003 2.52 1 0 1 1 0 0
2004 2.52 0 0 0 2 2 3
2005 2.52 0 0 1 2 2 3
2006 2.51 4 4 4 5 5 5
2007 2.51 15 12 11 11 8 8
2008 2.53 28 17 18 11 4 3
2009 2.52 2 0 0 4 1 0
2010 2.52 0 0 0 7 3 2
2011 2.52 9 4 4 6 6 5
2012 2.5 0 0 0 4 2 0
Source: author’s computations.
A. Tables II
Table A.2: Normal VaR Minimum capital requirements
Basel II MCR Zone Basel 2.5 MCR
Year Mean Min Max Gr. Yell. Red Mean Min Max Inc.
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1993 4.82 4.3 5.5 253 0 0 12.33 11.8 13 155.89
1994 4.58 4 5.2 64 188 0 13.16 11.5 14.8 187.42
1995 4.28 3.8 5.2 126 126 0 12.49 11.3 14.8 192.15
1996 5.12 3.9 5.6 7 247 0 14.33 11.4 15.3 180
1997 6.57 5.4 8.3 0 200 53 16.17 14.6 18.3 146.23
1998 8.29 6.8 10.2 48 204 0 17.05 14.3 19.3 105.67
1999 9.64 8.6 10.3 89 163 0 18.77 17.4 19.7 94.66
2000 9 8.5 9.6 252 0 0 18.91 18.4 19.5 110.04
2001 9.24 8.7 9.6 248 0 0 19.18 18.7 19.8 107.52
2002 10.1 8.9 12 149 103 0 20.87 19.1 23.5 106.59
2003 11.12 9.8 12.2 116 136 0 23.27 21.9 25.7 109.27
2004 8.78 6.6 9.8 252 0 0 20.89 18.7 21.9 138
2005 5.35 4.7 6.6 252 0 0 17.47 16.9 18.7 226.25
2006 4.62 4.5 4.7 251 0 0 16.74 16.6 16.9 262.24
2007 5.49 4.4 7.4 97 68 86 19.54 16.5 23.5 255.74
2008 9.82 7.4 16.3 0 0 253 25.97 23.5 32.4 164.57
2009 19.12 15.5 20.7 30 20 202 37.97 32.5 47.5 98.58
2010 14.87 11.6 15.5 252 0 0 34.96 31.7 35.6 135.21
2011 9.28 7.3 11.5 159 93 0 31.09 27.4 37.3 234.89
2012 10.25 8.3 11.7 93 157 0 33.82 28.4 37.5 229.85
Source: author’s computations.
A. Tables III
Table A.3: Student’s-t VaR Minimum capital requirements
Basel II MCR Zone Basel 2.5 MCR
Year Mean Min Max Gr. Yell. Red Mean Min Max Inc.
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1993 5.47 4.9 6.1 253 0 0 13.26 12.6 13.9 142.27
1994 4.99 4.5 5.8 121 131 0 13.51 12.3 15.5 170.67
1995 4.77 4.4 5.8 190 62 0 12.99 12.2 15.6 172.28
1996 5.45 4.5 6.3 86 168 0 14.34 12.3 16 163.26
1997 7.06 5.9 8.8 0 253 0 16.62 15 18.6 135.52
1998 8.76 7.4 11 100 152 0 17.46 15.2 20.1 99.22
1999 10.49 9.4 11.2 106 146 0 19.92 18.1 20.6 89.91
2000 9.84 9.2 10.5 252 0 0 20.68 20.1 21.4 110.07
2001 10.1 9.3 10.6 248 0 0 20.95 20.1 21.6 107.57
2002 10.49 9.6 11.9 244 8 0 21.61 20.7 24.4 105.89
2003 11.07 10.7 11.5 252 0 0 22.87 22.3 23.4 106.48
2004 9.81 7.1 10.7 252 0 0 22.16 19.5 23 125.84
2005 5.51 4.7 7.1 252 0 0 17.86 17.1 19.4 224.1
2006 4.7 4.6 4.8 251 0 0 17.05 16.9 17.2 262.84
2007 6.24 4.7 9.4 97 114 40 20.33 17.1 25.8 225.67
2008 13.04 9.4 23.5 0 27 226 29.42 25.8 40 125.64
2009 25.23 20 27.7 55 17 180 45.09 40.2 54.6 78.71
2010 20.73 15.6 21.9 252 0 0 44.71 39.6 45.9 115.65
2011 11.05 9 15.5 252 0 0 35.03 33 39.5 217.04
2012 11.46 10.7 12.2 250 0 0 35.44 34.7 36.2 209.27
Source: author’s computations.
A. Tables IV
Table A.4: HS VaR Minimum capital requirements
Basel II MCR Zone Basel 2.5 MCR
Year Mean Min Max Gr. Yell. Red Mean Min Max Inc.
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1993 5.3 4.4 5.7 253 0 0 14.43 13.5 14.9 172.28
1994 4.77 4.3 5.7 181 71 0 14.27 13.4 16.3 199.32
1995 4.92 4.7 5.7 193 59 0 14.36 13.8 16.4 191.97
1996 5.49 4.7 6.3 130 124 0 15.36 13.8 17 179.66
1997 7.34 5.4 9.1 6 247 0 17.98 14.5 20.2 145.1
1998 8.87 7.4 10.5 100 152 0 18.98 16.5 21.2 114
1999 9.31 9.2 10.5 248 4 0 19.34 18.4 21 107.83
2000 9.64 8.4 11.1 252 0 0 21.37 20.1 22.8 121.8
2001 9.36 8.4 10.5 248 0 0 21.26 20.2 23.6 127.02
2002 10 9.5 11.5 244 8 0 23.3 22.7 26.5 132.99
2003 10.86 10.4 11.9 179 73 0 24.62 23.6 26.9 126.59
2004 9.52 7 10.4 252 0 0 22.76 20.2 23.6 139.07
2005 5.2 4.6 7 252 0 0 18.44 17.8 20.2 254.81
2006 4.73 4.6 4.9 251 0 0 17.97 17.8 18.1 279.95
2007 6.52 4.8 10.3 97 114 40 21.63 18 27.9 231.79
2008 12.86 10.3 24.3 0 39 214 30.3 25.9 41.9 135.64
2009 25.95 20.8 27.8 55 12 185 48.18 42.1 61.6 85.66
2010 20.14 14.7 20.8 252 0 0 48.2 42.8 48.9 139.35
2011 11.07 9.5 14.6 252 0 0 39.13 37.5 42.7 253.52
2012 11.56 11.2 11.9 250 0 0 39.62 39.3 40 242.72
Source: author’s computations.
A. Tables V
Table A.5: Normal GARCH VaR Minimum capital requirements
Basel II MCR Zone Basel 2.5 MCR
Year Mean Min Max Gr. Yell. Red Mean Min Max Inc.
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1993 4.37 3.6 4.9 253 0 0 11.55 10.8 12.1 164.49
1994 4.79 3.4 5.5 35 198 19 13.45 10.6 14.9 180.71
1995 4.16 3.5 5.5 126 126 0 12.02 10.7 14.7 188.94
1996 5.85 3.8 6.9 7 247 0 14.66 11 16.1 150.53
1997 8.32 5.5 11.6 0 251 2 17.18 14.5 20.6 106.42
1998 9.29 5.9 14.8 91 161 0 17.27 13.1 23.2 85.84
1999 9.27 7.8 10.4 89 163 0 17.58 15.6 18.8 89.63
2000 9.38 7.5 12.4 171 81 0 18.14 15.9 21.9 93.34
2001 9.57 8.1 10.7 248 0 0 18.17 16.5 19.7 89.82
2002 10.39 8 15.3 244 8 0 20.79 18.4 27 100.17
2003 8.52 5.9 11.4 252 0 0 19 16.5 21.7 122.97
2004 5.17 4.9 5.9 252 0 0 15.74 15.4 16.4 204.16
2005 4.73 4.5 5 252 0 0 15.29 15.1 15.6 223.44
2006 4.61 4 5.2 228 23 0 15.3 14.6 16.6 231.98
2007 6.54 3.8 10.2 29 173 49 19.2 14.4 24.3 193.71
2008 16.46 10.2 40.6 0 20 233 30.5 23.9 54.7 85.32
2009 17.55 8.2 39.1 75 148 29 30.69 20.2 53.2 74.84
2010 9.56 6.5 14.5 79 173 0 23.4 18.5 29.2 144.8
2011 9.8 5.8 17.2 36 216 0 23.78 17.9 31.3 142.64
2012 7.25 5.3 13.7 119 131 0 20.18 17.4 27.8 178.26
Source: author’s computations.
A. Tables VI
Table A.6: Student’s-t GARCH VaR Minimum capital requirements
Basel II MCR Zone Basel 2.5 MCR
Year Mean Min Max Gr. Yell. Red Mean Min Max Inc.
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1993 4.68 3.9 5.3 253 0 0 11.93 11.1 12.6 154.75
1994 4.85 3.7 6.2 121 131 0 12.78 10.9 15.2 163.43
1995 4.64 3.9 6.2 167 85 0 12.38 11.2 15.2 166.6
1996 5.74 4.3 7 122 132 0 13.58 11.5 15.4 136.81
1997 7.67 5 11.7 187 66 0 15.17 12.2 19.9 97.69
1998 9.45 6.5 14.3 147 105 0 17.14 13.7 22.5 81.45
1999 9.04 8.5 9.6 252 0 0 16.86 16 18.2 86.53
2000 9.59 7.9 11.8 252 0 0 18.53 16.9 20.7 93.26
2001 10.28 8.7 11.5 248 0 0 19.44 17.6 21.1 89.06
2002 10.91 8.5 15.1 252 0 0 21.91 19.5 26.1 100.76
2003 8.71 6 11.8 252 0 0 19.7 16.9 22.8 126.32
2004 5.2 4.9 5.9 252 0 0 16.19 15.9 16.9 211.66
2005 4.75 4.6 5 252 0 0 15.75 15.6 16 231.6
2006 4.64 4.2 5 228 23 0 15.77 15.2 17.3 239.83
2007 7.16 4 11.9 75 176 0 19.52 15 25.6 172.68
2008 16.51 10.6 34.8 39 214 0 29.41 23.1 45.8 78.15
2009 16.85 8.8 33.6 158 94 0 29.04 21.7 45.5 72.38
2010 8.94 6.9 12.7 252 0 0 21.83 19.7 25.6 144.15
2011 10.48 6 19.4 147 105 0 24.26 18.9 34.4 131.52
2012 7.83 5.9 15.7 217 33 0 20.98 18.8 30.7 167.89
Source: author’s computations.
A. Tables VII
Table A.7: Volatility weighted HS VaR Minimum capital require-
ments
Basel II MCR Zone Basel 2.5 MCR
Year Mean Min Max Gr. Yell. Red Mean Min Max Inc.
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1993 4.31 3.6 5.1 253 0 0 13.98 13.2 14.7 224.39
1994 4.82 3.5 6.2 121 131 0 15.24 13.2 17.5 215.78
1995 4.79 4.2 6.2 193 59 0 14.79 13.9 17.5 208.73
1996 6.35 4.6 7.9 148 106 0 16.56 14.3 18.9 160.71
1997 8.66 5.6 12.2 253 0 0 18.33 15.2 21.9 111.73
1998 11.32 8 19 214 38 0 21.19 17.6 30 87.12
1999 11.13 9.1 12.1 252 0 0 21.55 20.4 23.2 93.56
2000 10.38 8.1 13.9 252 0 0 22.25 20 25.8 114.32
2001 10.14 8.5 11.3 248 0 0 22.11 20.4 23.3 118.05
2002 10.77 8.3 14.9 252 0 0 23.61 21.1 27.8 119.21
2003 8.78 6 12.1 252 0 0 21.62 18.8 25 146.29
2004 5.1 4.7 5.9 252 0 0 17.94 17.6 18.8 251.92
2005 4.64 4.4 5 252 0 0 17.48 17.2 17.8 277.05
2006 4.98 4.2 6.3 144 107 0 18.55 17.1 20.8 272.68
2007 7.37 4.1 12.4 65 186 0 22.11 17 28.4 200.23
2008 17.85 10.2 41.5 99 154 0 32.15 23.1 54.4 80.1
2009 19.03 10 40 252 0 0 33.92 28.5 52.8 78.24
2010 9.67 6.6 14.2 252 0 0 28.48 25.4 33 194.55
2011 11.14 5.8 21.8 149 103 0 30.98 24.6 43.1 177.96
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Proposed topic Stressed Value-at-Risk: Assessing extended Basel II reg-
ulation
Topic characteristics Value at Risk (VaR) is a popular tool of risk manage-
ment used to measure maximal losses of a specific portfolio at a given signifi-
cance level. Because of its simplicity (outcome is one number) it has been set
by regulators for IRB (Internal rating based) banks as a device to calculate
their minimal capital requirements. But recent crisis revealed several prob-
lems. Although VaR measures maximal loss of a portfolio, it does not tell
us anything about losses beyond chosen significance level. Another issue is a
common assumption of normally distributed profits and losses which tend to
underestimate VaR.
In reaction to significant bank losses which were higher than the minimum
capital requirements the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS)
suggested adding the Stress Value-at-Risk (SVaR) to the current VaR. Stress
VaR is a measure of portfolio risk which takes into account long time horizon
(1 year) of financial stress. This additional requirement should according to
BCBS reduce the pro-cyclicality of the minimum capital requirements.
First aim of this thesis will be review of the VaR model. We will analyze
advantages of this model and its weaknesses as well. Then we will focus on
the Stress VaR and attempt to find out whether it is a useful measure for an
extreme risk and evaluate its performance in comparison with the VaR model.
After that several models for VaR under fat tail distributions will be analyzed
and compared with the Gaussian VaR.
Hypotheses
Master Thesis Proposal XIII
1. Normal Value-at-Risk is not sufficient tool for measuring risk, especially
in the stress period (e.g. crisis).
2. Stress VaR (SVaR) is an efficient device to assess and report financial
risk.
3. We endeavour to assess whether the higher capital requirements implied
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